In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sacrificial "As-If" and Avuncular HilarityLiving by MéconnaissanceWiel Eggen (bio)INTRODUCTION: THE CURIOUS QUESTIONAt my departure for anthropological fieldwork in the Central African Republic (RCA), just after Girard's seminal work La Violence et le sacré had come to upset my structuralist tutors in Paris, I was given a list of penetrating questions to probe in the field, since my research was to be conducted in an area known for its (...) a-cephalous traditions with little or no political or religious centralization.1 The prime critique concerned Girard's apparent return to a bluntly utilitarian vision of myth and religion as the mental framework of society's ritual foundations, in line with Durkheim's functionalist analysis of archaic religion, which was finely reworded in Lord Raglan's recent preface to a cluster of Hocart's articles titled The Life-Giving Myth.2 The approach had come to dominate, as a way of unraveling outdated transcendentalist claims, and also underpinned Freudian and Marxist attacks on religion. After Kant's Critique of Pure Reason had given the lie to any claims of access to transcendent realms, the deontological view of religion as society's functionalist toolbox for orderly [End Page 69] conduct became dominant. But, inspired also by such "masters of suspicion" in human sciences, structuralism had set out even beyond that utilitarian perspective. In a decisive bolt of relativism, it took myths to be a mere mental ordering of daily observations into a logical frame, independent of any ritual or social utility. So, how could Girard once again declare social control via rituals to be religion's true aim, allot a prime role to sacrificial rites, and, most alarmingly, thereby raise the suspicion of aiming to rehabilitate Christian dogmas?I was urged to go and check this theory on sacrifices, scapegoating, social rivalry, and on the shaping of archaic society, its forms of authority, and even sacred kingship. Reflecting on the questions, though, I noted that they overlooked a critical point in Girard's hypothesis, which I read as reverse functionalism. In fact, Girard viewed religion's social function and the issuing cultural regulations as rooted in a radical "lie," or in what he labels méconnaissance. Worded in evolutionary terms, he hypothesized not so much a kind of Darwinian utilitarian adaptation, but rather the alternative of "exaptation," or what has been called an oblique functionalism.After I had learned enough of the Banda language to start my research, though, my schedules were thrown in disarray on my first evening in the village that was to be my starting point. It presented me with a curious quandary. The village of Wademi, some 25 km north of Ippy, in the sparsely populated wooded savannah, was home to two exogamous patrilineal clans that straddle a little river and sit on a dirt road constructed by the colonial power for the collection of cotton. To oversee this two-clan unit a chief had been appointed with the title of makonji, a loanword from the national Sango language. This gentle, friendly man had offered to host me in his own cemented house and organized a welcome for me in the customary way of staging a pleasant storytelling session, punctuated with joyous songs and dances, lasting well into the night. Most of the stories and songs figured Tere, the famous trickster figure, who resembles Ture in neighboring Azande-land, well documented by E. Evans-Pritchard.3 The enjoyable, moonlit session was shot through with outbursts of laughter. It brought the two clans together, including the women and children. Before turning in, the makonji's junior son, who had been assigned my assistant and interpreter, came to convey his father's sincere but puzzling query, whether Tere actually was the same as Jesus Christ. Actually, his French name in Banda phonetics implied so: Christ Jésu = Tre se te jesu; and "Jesu Christ = Jesu Tre."4 Taken by surprise and much in need of some rest after a rather demanding day, I politely asked to let the issue rest till the morning.This question was all the more disturbing, as Christians were wont to call Jesus the Lord, and relate this to chieftaincy... (shrink)

This article examines the impact that the interplay between workplace, the welfare state and global working life has on female workers when they become pregnant. By focusing on two highly educated Norwegian female workers, it explores how this change process takes place in two companies operating in the global market located in different countries: Norway and the US. Pregnancy contributes to transforming the neutralized bodiless female worker into an embodied worker with gender. The female workers' experiences and negotiations represent forms (...) of global action on local stages. This is illustrated by four processes: `married to work', `pregnant and still married to work', `negotiating separation from work' and `excluding mothering'. The findings indicate the significance of taking welfare state and workplace policy approaches into consideration in studies of global effects on employees. (shrink)

Girard counts as a Durkheimian for viewing religion as the social force that underpins society's cultural institutions. A basic difference, though, should be heeded. No doubt, he argues that the bloody solution of the originary mimetic crisis initiated traditions of sacrificial rituals with mythical justifications that crystallized in society's legal codes, ethical rules, and cultural habits, on which daily events of scapegoating rely. However, if this suggests that religion's basic aim is to be a buttress of the cultural order, it (...) must be noticed that Girard's core conviction points in a different direction with a curious ambiguity, which asks for a seldom effectuated two-pronged analysis. In fact, his crucial... (shrink)

Twenty years ago, Slobodan Milosevic uttered a sentence which was afterwards repeated in the literature about the Yugoslav tragedy innummerable times. The sentence "Niko ne sme da vas bije" was directed to the Serb demonstrators in Kosovo. In this text, the author analyzes the ways this sentence was translated in factional literature and shows that different versions, apart from being different lexically and semantically, influence the political interpretation and understanding of the Yugoslav conflict. This text poses another, maybe even more (...) important question: are unprecise and wrong translations of Milosevic's words a proof of what Georg Johannesen claimed - that faction is fiction.. Pre dvadeset godina Slobodan Milosevic je izgovorio jednu recenicu koja je ponavljana nebrojeno puta u literaturi o jugoslovenskoj tragediji. Ta recenica je izgovorena u neposrednom kontaktu sa demonstrantima srpske nacionalnosti na Kosovu i glasi "Niko ne sme da vas bije". U ovom tekstu autor istrazuje nacine na koje je ova recenica prevodjena u strucnoj literaturi i/ili faktivnoj prozi i pokazuje kako njene razlicite verzije, osim sto se odlikuju velikim jezickim i semantickim razlikama, usmeravaju politicko tumacenje i razumevanje jugoslovenskog konflikta. Ovim tekstom postavlja se jos jedno, mozda i vaznije pitanje: da li je neprecizno i pogresno navodjenje Milosevicevog iskaza potvrda onoga sto je o faktivnoj prozi i/ili strucnoj literaturi govorio Georg Johanesen - da se radi o izmisljanju - fikciji sklopljenoj od reci.. (shrink)

Cowpea mosaic virus (CPMV) is the type member of the comovirus group, which contains 14 different plant viruses that have the same structural organization of genomic RNAs and virions and use the same mechanism for expression of the viral RNAs. The combined structure and organization of the two CPMV genomic RNAs is strikingly similar to that of the single genome of animal picornaviruses. This suggests a common ancestry and similar replication mechanisms. CPMV is by far the best‐studied comovirus and we (...) shall limit this review to some recent data on this virus. For additional general information the reader is referred to other recent reviews on CPMV and comoviruses1,2. (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva fornecer uma apresentação crítica, compreensiva e inédita na língua portuguesa do Processamento Preditivo (PP) – um esquema teórico para a compreensão da cognição que propõe uma inversão de nosso entendimento padrão da ação, percepção, sensação e sua relação. Aqui, nosso objetivo primário será introduzir os principais conceitos e ideias do PP, tratando-o como um modelo moderadamente corporificado de cognição e analisando suas credenciais como uma proposta teórica unificadora. Para tanto, partiremos de uma contextualização histórica de algumas (...) correntes de pensamento que teriam fomentado seu desenvolvimento inicial, passando por uma descrição não-matemática do Princípio da Energia Livre, que fundamenta e subentende a atuação de suas especificidades para, então, esclarecermos o papel que, segundo o PP, a inferência bayesiana, a minimização dos erros de predição e a chamada Inferência Ativa possuiriam na manutenção homeostática de nossos cérebros e corpos preditivos. Por fim, forneceremos uma síntese de algumas consequências daquilo que o PP poderia trazer à compreensão contemporânea do cérebro e comportamento humanos, concluindo que, embora sua descrição da cognição como um processo preditivo único e contínuo prometa eventualmente unificar paradigmas explicativos e níveis de análise distintos, por ora, talvez seja melhor concebê-lo de forma mais modesta, como uma ferramenta ou heurística para nos auxiliar a repensar vários dos tópicos centrais ao estudo científico e filosófico da mente. (shrink)

Automated classification of legal documents has been the subject of extensive research in recent years. However, this is still a challenging task for long documents, since it is difficult for a model to identify the most relevant information for classification. In this paper, we propose a two-stage supervised learning approach for the classification of petitions, a type of legal document that requests a court order. The proposed approach is based on a word-level encoder–decoder Seq2Seq deep neural network, such as a (...) Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) or a Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) model, and a document-level Support Vector Machine classifier. To address the challenges posed by the lengthy legal documents, the approach introduces a human-in-the-loop approach, whose task is to localize and tag relevant segments of text in the word-level training part, which dramatically reduces the dimension of the document classifier input vector. We performed experiments to validate our approach using a real-world dataset comprised of 270 intermediate petitions, which were carefully annotated by specialists from the 15th civil unit of the State of Alagoas, Brazil. Our results revealed that both BiLSTM and BERT-Convolutional Neural Networks variants achieved an accuracy of up to 95.49%, and also outperformed baseline classifiers based on the Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency test vectorizer. The proposed approach is currently being utilized to automate the aforementioned justice unit, thereby increasing its efficiency in handling repetitive tasks. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the ancient Greeks thought that Thales was the first philosopher, and that they therefore maintained that philosophy had a Greek origin. This paper challenges these assumptions, arguing that most ancient Greek thinkers who expressed views about the history and development of philosophy rejected both positions. I argue that not even Aristotle presented Thales as the first philosopher, and that doing so would have undermined his philosophical commitments and interests. Beyond Aristotle, the view that Thales was (...) the first philosopher is attested almost nowhere in antiquity. In the classical, Hellenistic, and post-Hellenistic periods, we witness a marked tendency to locate the beginning of philosophy in a time going back further than Thales. Remarkably, ancient Greek thinkers most often traced the origins of philosophy to earlier non-Greek peoples. Contrary to the received view, then, I argue that (1) vanishingly few Greek writers pronounced Thales the first philosopher; and (2) most Greek thinkers did not even advocate a Greek origin of philosophy. Finally, I show that the view that philosophy originated with Thales (along with its misleading attribution to the Greeks in general) has roots in problematic, and in some cases manifestly racist, eighteenth-century historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

The first part of this article examines Patricia O'Grady's recent attempt to identify the method by which Thales might have successfully predicted a solar eclipse. According to O'Grady, some 60% of the potentially visible lunar eclipses were followed 23½ months later by potentially visible solar eclipses. It is shown that this ratio is no more than 23%, and that the method fails to predict after which specific lunar eclipse a solar eclipse will appear. In the second half of the article (...) it is argued that on the basis of his own observations of major solar eclipses, Thales could have concluded that solar eclipses come in clusters of three, the second appearing 17 or 18 months, and the third 35 months, after the first one. In the years after the "predicted" eclipse of 28 May 585 BC, this apparent pattern disappeared again, which would explain why Thales managed to "predict" only one eclipse. (shrink)

The Greeks attributed to Thales a great many discoveries and achievements. Few, if any, of these can be said to rest on thoroughly reliable testimony, most of them being the ascriptions of commentators and compilers who lived anything from 700 to 1,000 years after his death—a period of time equivalent to that between William the Conqueror and the present day. Inevitably there ilso accumulated round the name of Thales, as round that of Pythagoras , a number of anecdotes of varying (...) degrees of plausibility and of no historical worth whatsoever. These and the achievements credited to Thales have, of course, been painstakingly brought together by Hermann Diels in Der Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Useful and necessary as this work undoubtedly is, it nevertheless has probably contributed as much as any other book to the exaggerated and false Aew of Thales which we meet in so many modern histories of science or philosophy, and which it is the purpose of this article to combat. (shrink)

The Theaetetus is about the definition of knowledge, but also about the young Theaetetus acquiring knowledge and sophia. By defining knowledge he gives an account of his personal vocation. According to the Protagorean interpretation of his first definition, any object of knowledge is at least co-determined by the subject who grasps it. There is no proper distinction between subject and object, no right or wrong epistemic approach or perspective on any object. The digression presents Theaetetus with a comparison of this (...) Protagorean sophia and true sophia which is the aim of the philosopher. It shows Theaetetus and the reader what a life that has either kind of sophia as its end amounts to. It also shows him that true sophia does involve a proper perspective toward its objects, that Theaetetus has to be careful which perspective he chooses, that he can improve upon his perspective, and that not everyone will approve of his choice of perspective and of the ensuing activities. The Thracian servant is an example for someone who does not approve, since she doesn’t know about perspectives. This is brought out in the anecdote, which presents the servant’s point of view. It is only the servant’s assumption that Thales fell into the well while observing stars. In fact, Thales wanted to observe zenith stars and deliberately chose a point of view, namely the bottom of a well, which allowed him to focus his field of vision on a well-defined section of the sky. Theaetetus must come to understand that the servant is missing the point of Thales’ actions. It must become clear to him that epistemic and moral success requires a careful choice of one’s perspective – and that this choice matters despite all adverse reaction he may have to face because of it. (shrink)

This book, Thales and the beginnings of European reflection, is more than a field guide to all major testimonies about Thales. It does not merely contain a summary and critique of the available literature on the subject, but also lays down a new, holistic interpretation of Thales from a perspective that brings to light several important, but previously overlooked issues."--Page [4] of cover.

Thales the Measurer offers a comprehensive and iconoclastic account of Thales of Miletus, considering the full extent of our evidence to build a new picture of his intellectual interests and activity. Thales is most commonly associated with the claim that 'everything is water', but closer examination of the evidence that we have suggests that he could not have said anything of the sort. His real interests, and his real innovations, lay in challenges of quantitative measurement, especially measurements related to the (...) movement of the sun. In this he had no predecessors - and, for centuries to follow, no real successors either. This book is of interest for scholars in the history of philosophy, science, and life sciences. It is aimed especially at researchers in the field, but is also accessible to students and a more general readership. (shrink)

It is customary to associate the birth of European science with the name of Thales. For example: "In the history of mankind there come moments when new forms of action or thought arise so suddenly that they produce the impression of an explosion. Such is precisely the case with the rise of science—rationalistic scientific knowledge—in Asiatic Greece, in Ionia, at the end of the seventh century B.C.E., with Thales of Miletus and his school".

À partir d’une anthropologie historique des témoignages sur la sophia de Thalès et Anaxagore, cet article tente de discuter l’idée, encore dominante dans l’historiographie courante de la philosophie, d’une « naissance de la philosophie » en Ionie au vie siècle, coïncidant avec un passage du « mythe à la Raison », du « religieux » au « scientifique ». Le savoir-sagesse des « Ioniens », y compris dans ses aspects que nous définirions comme « rationnels », ne peut se pratiquer (...) que dans la dépendance des dieux. Les deux figures étudiées sont celles pour lesquelles les témoignages sont suffisamment nombreux : il s’agit de Thalès, le fondateur de l’école, et d’Anaxagore, qui en aurait transmis l’esprit à Athènes. (shrink)

In Heraclitus and Thales’ Conceptual Scheme: A Historical Study Aryeh Finkelberg rejects the teleological interpretation of early Greek thought as targeted at later results, viz. philosophy, and seeks to determine its intended meaning by restoring it to its historical context.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and PhilosophyKevin RobbPatricia F. O’Grady. Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and Philosophy. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2002. Pp xxii + 310. Paper, $84.95.This book has a consistent thesis: Thales of Miletus was the first Western scientist and philosopher not just for what he began, but for what he himself said (or, as O'Grady believes, wrote). On this view, (...) Thales made significant contributions to metaphysics ("He asked the question: 'What is real?' no less than Plato and Aristotle did," 249), cosmology (on the earth and earthquakes, 87 ff.), astronomy (notably the eclipse, 126 ff.), mathematics (Proclus attributes Euclidean theorems to Thales, 191 ff.), psychology (on psyche) and theology (on "full of the gods," 108 ff.). O'Grady's thesis is that we know enough about Thales' thoughts in these areas (each a treacherous minefield of scholarly dispute, as O'Grady admits) that, after a clarified understanding of "Scientificity and Rationality" (her awkward title for Chapter 11), we can confidently conclude that philosophy and science were well begun by Thales. "I believe I have drawn a clear and detailed picture of a brilliant, veracious, and courageously speculative Greek. I see him as a questioner of almost everything, an investigator of nature...Thales is not the mere shadowy figure of Guthrie's perception. He is a man of substance, a man of distinction and of lasting importance" (251).O'Grady had early noted that W. K. C. Guthrie considered Thales a shadowy figure historically, made all the more so, Guthrie believed, because the legend kept expanding. For example, a sixth-century Thales as the seeker after the material archê, and so the first important physikos, is unknown before fourth-century Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha, and by the time Euclidean theorems are attributed to Thales the tendency to foist imposing discoveries on famous persons was prevalent.This raises the major issue concerning O'Grady's exhaustively researched book. To what extent can the doxographic sources (the "A" sections of Diels's 1903Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker), be used to interpret the Presocratics, especially if the original wording from a thinker perished (any "B" section quotations). It is clear that in the fourth century nothing in writing from Thales survived for the Lyceum to read and catalogue although its scholars clearly sought it; the repeated legetai ("it is said") of Aristotle in Metaphysics Alpha and elsewhere is decisive. It is his standard way of indicating that no written work on the matter survives to be consulted, but stories or oral accounts do.O'Grady's thesis requires that the "A" section material be exploited fully, especially to present Thales as a philosopher (29-70). Many historians will be unwilling to take the entire journey with her. Some (Harold Cherniss) would balk at the first step. The demand for confirming ipsissima verba (or "B" quotations) to reconstruct the thought of any Presocratic with real confidence (as once proposed by G. S. Kirk) threatens to exclude Thales from histories of philosophy, an unsatisfactory result. Even so, Harold Cherniss proposed that drastic solution in 1935 in his magisterial Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratric Philosophy. Presocratic philosophy, he argued, should begin with Anaximander (375).The heart of Cherniss's numbingly exhaustive argument (400 + pages) was that Aristotle's purpose in surveying his predecessors's views was never historical, but dialectical. His intent was to argue for a fourfold causality (on the grounds only four archai had been turned up by all his predecessors, starting with Thales' material cause), and to fit those predecessors's views into a theory of natural causality as he had finally formulated it in his sophisticated, [End Page 107] largely technical vocabulary. Aristotle's "historical" notices on which all later accounts must depend were, thus, never history; the problem and the solution, along with their language, were Aristotle's alone. If Theophrastus paraphrased what he found in Aristotle (McDiarmid), and if the post-Aristotelian doxographic notices were largely dependent on Theophrastus (so already Diels in 1879, in Doxographi Graeci), then any attempt to extract a philosophical Thales from the later doxographic sources (or Aristotle) is methodologically doomed from... (shrink)

The paper attempts to reconstruct Thales’ argument about water, which is rightly considered to be the core of his philosophy of nature. It consists of two separate arguments – one biological and the other physical – which ascribe to water two different functions: in the first case, it is a source of life on the earth or, in another version, a source of life of the earth in its entirety; in the second case, it is something that supports the earth (...) in its stationary position in the cosmos. These two arguments indicate that Thales’ notion of water was meant to answer more than just one question about nature. This, in turn, might justify the use of the concept of arche, which Aristotle attributed to the Ionian philosophers, even though Thales had obviously never used the term. The concept may somehow accurately render Thales’ more general view of water. It should be noted, however, that if the term arche can be applied to Thales’ views, then it is only in the sense related to the “coming-to-be”. Thales’ arguments did not apply – contrary to what some doxographers said and what certain scholars still maintain – to the question of the end, or perishing of physical things, the problem taken up only by later Ionians. To put it differently, Thales never claimed that the physical things which die or undergo destruction change into water. (shrink)

Thisvolume contains the most complete collection ever assembled of the documentary evidence on Thales of Miletus. Approximately 600 texts, dating from the 6th century BCE to the 14th century CE, are presented in chronological order, both in the original language and in a facing English translation. An index of names as well as extensive glossaries and word indexes of the texts and translations are provided.